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The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
This report was prepared by the Centre for International Cooperation and Security based 
in Bradford University’s Department of Peace Studies. It is part of a wider project – the 
Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) – which is being funded by the UK 
government’s Department for International Development (DFID).  
 
The AVPI is made up of four projects: 
1) A Briefing Papers series on armed violence and poverty reduction measures in the 
areas of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration), SSR (Security Sector 
Reform), Conflict Assessment, and Rural Livelihoods. 
2) An assessment of the impact of small arms projects on arms availability and poverty. 
3) A research project which documents and analyses the circumstances in and processes 
by which armed violence exacerbates poverty and development. 
4) A research project which documented the impact of arms transfers on poverty and 
development. 
 
All of these reports can be downloaded from www.bradford.ac.uk/cics. 
 
This initiative, which expanded beyond DFID to involve a number of donor agencies and 
NGOs, grew out of a concern to understand the problems created by arms availability and 
their violent use, and of the ways in which measures to reduce armed violence can be 
integrated into poverty reduction work at both policy and programme level. This briefing 
aims to highlight and clarify the importance of the availability and misuse of small arms 
and light weapons (SALW), and associated armed violence, for development 
programming in the areas of governance, security sector reform (SSR), and safety, 
security and access to justice (SSAJ).  
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1. Introduction 
 
This briefing aims to highlight and clarify the importance of the availability and misuse 
of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and associated armed violence, for 
development programming in the areas of governance, security sector reform (SSR), and 
safety, security and access to justice (SSAJ).  By doing so the effectiveness of 
governance, SSR and SSAJ programmes can be enhanced. Moreover, governance, SSR 
and SSAJ programmes can be developed to contribute more to the reduction of armed 
violence perpetrated with SALW and facilitated by their availability.   
 
 
2. Why are SALW issues relevant for governance and 
governance programming? 
 
The wide availability of SALW facilitates and intensifies armed violence – including 
large-scale conflict, inter-communal conflict, inter-personal violence, and violent crime – 
all of which have profound impacts upon governance.  It can exacerbate other conditions 
sustaining violence.  In particular the availability and misuse of SALW: 
 
 Constrains state reach – particularly into rural areas.  
 Challenges the re-establishment and strength of state institutions following protracted 
civil wars.  
 Damages relationships between government and civil society.  
 Contributes to human rights abuses. 
 Interferes with and raises the costs of the delivery of basic services. 
 Reduces the space for participation, consultation and democratic processes, such as 
elections. 
 Undermines the ability of the state – as well as traditional and non-state justice 
systems – to manage or resolve disputes peacefully. 
 Contributes to the growth of cultures of violence. 
 Facilitates intimidation, which denies the poor access to justice. 
 Negatively affects personal safety and security in communities. 
 Affects the ability of national security institutions to manage and resolve differences 
between communities to avoid violent conflicts.   
 
It is also important to recognise the role of poor governance in increasing the risks and 
intensity of armed violence. High levels of violent crime are, in part, caused by limited 
governance capacities to provide safety, security, and access to justice.  Poor governance 
can create social and economic exclusion and weak legal and judicial systems. In this 
type of situation armed violence may be seen by some people to be a livelihood option.   
 
Governance programmes can help to increase the capacity of developing countries to 
govern themselves in a way that manages tensions and prevents or reduces armed 
violence. However, conducting governance programmes in situations of pervasive armed 
violence is difficult.  SALW issues can be important for governance programming in four 
main ways: 
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 Governance programmes – as with many types of transitions – can run the risk of 
alienating previously privileged groups, or help bring grievances to the fore.  In a 
situation of wide availability of SALW the potential for these grievances to become 
violent is heightened.  If violence breaks out a governance programme could be 
obstructed.   
 Governance programmes aim to provide economic stability and facilitate investment 
and poverty reduction.  Armed violence can undermine stability, deter investment, 
reduce and distort economic activity, and thereby challenge governance 
programming.   
 Armed violence increases the costs of delivering basic services.  These costs may 
affect the options for governance programming and their effectiveness. 
 Mobilising public concern and action on armed violence and other SALW issues can 
be a valuable entry-point to develop wider partnerships and improve governance.    
 
3. How are SALW issues relevant for safety, security and access 
to justice? 
 
Safety, Security and Access to Justice (SSAJ) is a core element of good governance and 
is promoted through three main elements: effective and accountable policing, an effective 
and independent judicial and penal system, and a military and internal security apparatus 
that is professional, under effective political and administrative control, respecting the 
legal system and human rights.  Building public trust in policing, justice and the rule of 
law is essential.  The issue of SALW availability and armed violence can affect these 
areas in a number of ways: 
 
3.1 Policing  
The availability of SALW facilitates armed crime, which places a high burden on 
policing.  In urban areas this can become overwhelming, with localities where armed 
gangs hold sway, and through the creation of virtual police “no-go” areas, as has 
happened, for example, in parts of Johannesburg, Kingston, Rio de Janeiro, Karachi and 
many other cities.  In rural areas where the reach of the state is limited and police forces 
are already overstretched, the availability of SALW makes effective policing more 
difficult. Local police are often routinely ‘outgunned’, or inclined to operate more as an 
occupation force rather than a police service. However, in many cases the issue is not 
police effectiveness, but undue police violence against civilians. Obviously, this also 
negatively affects access to justice. If the police are not – or not seen to be – reliable and 
accountable, access to justice through the legal system is curtailed, thus making violent 
means of seeking justice– such as the use of uncontrolled and unaccountable militias – a 
more attractive option.  
 
3.2 Access to justice 
Effective access to justice for all requires an effective and politically independent 
judiciary, appropriate laws and legal procedures, and effective penal systems, including 
where appropriate community level traditional dispute resolution systems. The 
availability of SALW can undermine these mechanisms, generating a climate of fear and 
allowing intimidation. Efforts to improve access to efficient and independent justice 
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systems will be undermined if armed violence, intimidation, and militarised communal 
power structures are not tackled.   
 
While wide availability and misuse of SALW obstruct and undermine efforts to promote 
SSAJ, these can also be an important entry point for generating debate and action in 
support of programmes to enhance policing and judicial systems. Experience shows that 
concerns about gun violence can be a rallying point for cooperative action amongst 
otherwise divided social groups, and a focus for developing improved police-community 
relations or improving and enforcing laws.  
 
4. Why are SALW issues relevant for security sector reform? 
 
Good governance requires that the state has the capability “to manage national security 
arrangements accountably, and to resolve differences between communities before they 
develop into violent conflicts.” (DFID, 2001) In order to achieve this, many developing 
or conflict-prone countries and those undergoing a transition from authoritarian rule 
require a process of security sector reform (SSR). This is a developing area of 
development programming, and there is no universally agreed definition of its scope and 
aims – and these vary according to the context of the country concerned.  However, 
within HMG’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool SSR strategy, the definition of aims are 
“to help developing and transitional countries manage their security functions in a 
democratically accountable, efficient and effective way by initiating and supporting 
reform and providing appropriate education and training.” 
 
 
Box 1: The security sector 
 
The Security Sector, broadly defined, comprises all those institutions responsible for 
protecting the state and communities within it.  This includes:  
 Bodies authorised to use force (the armed forces, police, and paramilitary units). 
 Intelligence and security services;. 
 Civil management and oversight bodies (the president/prime minister, the legislature 
and legislative committees, national security advisory bodies, statutory civil society 
organisations, the Ministries of defence, interior, finance, and foreign affairs).  
 Judicial and public security bodies (the judiciary, justice ministries, defence and 
prosecution services, prisons and corrections services, human rights commissions, 
and customary and traditional justice systems);. 
 Non-state security bodies (private security companies, political party militias, 
liberation armies, civil defence forces and other militia), though these are often 
neglected in SSR programmes. 
 Civil society bodies (non-governmental organisations, advocacy, the media, 
professional and religious organisations).   
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The reasons armed violence and SALW availability are important for SSR include: 
 State and civil society oversight of the security sector is likely to be undermined in a 
situation of armed violence. In particular, public awareness and discussion of security 
issues – as emphasised in existing DFID guidance – may be curtailed because of fear 
and intimidation. 
 Desire to tackle and reduce armed violence can provide a focus for mobilising support 
for SSR, to address inadequacies in the police and other security services. 
Alternatively, wide insecurity can create conditions for popular support for 
vigilantism or authoritarian policing. Outcomes depend on specific local factors, but 
the relationship between SALW and SSR issues is often close and complex. 
 SSR processes may generate grievances among soldiers and officers either because 
they are being demobilised or disempowered, or their access to resources (perhaps 
through corruption) are reduced.  For instance, reform processes may threaten the 
economic interests of the military – such as the military industrial complexes in 
Indonesia – and of groups of soliders – including criminal activities by soldiers in 
conflict zones such as “Sobels” (soldiers by day, rebels by night) in Sierra Leone.  
The potential for these actors to engage in violent activity is enhanced by the 
availability of SALW – not least from inadequately controlled state weapons stocks.  
Such activities promote the risk of derailing the reform process.   
 Persuading civilians to give up their arms in voluntary weapons collection 
programmes involves building community trust in the police and the security sector to 
provide them with security.  
 
5. How can SALW programmes be linked with governance, SSR, 
and SSAJ programming? 
  
Governance, SSR and SSAJ programmes can have better prospects for success when they 
take into account SALW and armed violence issues. Likewise, these programmes can 
enhance the success of SALW projects. Key benefits of integration, or at least linkage, 
include: 
 Some SALW-related issues, such as border control, stockpile management, or 
weapons’ collection are often seen as less politically sensitive than SSR, thereby 
creating entry points for engagement with other security issues and wider reform 
processes.  
 SALW issues relate to a wide range of security sector agencies, providing multiple 
entry-points for engaging with them and linking with wider SSR efforts. Thus, 
programmes to address illicit arms trafficking may involve engagement with customs, 
border guards, police, military, judicial and intelligence services. Issues to do with the 
development and enforcement of laws regulating arms possession, trade and 
production can feed into broader concerns of legal reform, parliamentary and 
government debate. Efforts to improve security of official arms stockpiles involve 
links with elements of the police and military that may otherwise be relatively 
isolated from reform processes.  
 SALW programmes can help create networks between the community and the 
military, police, and judiciary. For example, weapons collection and destruction 
programmes can link with local government, police and community.  
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 Integrated activities can help build the capacity of civil society to engage with 
security issues – thereby enhancing accountability and ensuring that the security 
sector is responsive to community security needs. 
 It can help lay the foundations for tackling transnational security threats through 
regional cooperation, as in police networks in East Africa (EAPCCO) and Southern 
Africa (SARPCCO). 
 
Box 2: Linking SALW projects and  
SSR – the case of Cambodia 
 
The EU-Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (ASAC) 
project was effectively linked with SSR by:  
 Including the security forces in weapons collection and destruction programmes, 
insisting on appropriate cooperation between relevant police and military forces and 
local and national authorities, and building community-security sector relationships. 
 Supporting wide social and parliamentary engagement with arms law reform. 
 Including key elements of SSR programming within its scope.  For example, a key 
aim of the project is to increase public trust in protection by police forces. This has 
been pursued through: 
o Training police in human rights;  
o Training the families of police officers in skills to enhance their livelihoods 
in order to try to reduce the incentives for police corruption; 
o Supporting the registration and safe storage of weapons stocks by the 
military (Ministry of National Defence) and the National Police. 
5.1 SSR programming 
 
In SSR programmes there are opportunities to integrate SALW and armed violence issues 
in the planning stage by conducting an assessment in which linkages are examined; and 
by addressing selected SALW issues as part of the engagement with the security sector 
agencies concerned.  
 
5.1.1 Conducting a security assessment from the user’s perspective – 
particularly the poor and vulnerable groups  
SSR programmes commonly include a security and a security sector assessment.  This is 
primarily focussed upon key institutions of the security sector.  Integrating a security 
assessment from the perspective of the security priorities of the poor and vulnerable, 
which are often particularly concerned about armed violence, will help develop effective 
phasing of reforms and contribute to the necessary buy-in of communities.  Such an 
assessment should consider the security context, the political context, relations between 
military, police and civilians, and whether and where there is social demand for SSR, 
taking into account SALW issues as appropriate. Community consultations in the security 
assessment process could help establish key concerns and local dynamics, as well as 
establishing community support. National Action Plans on Small Arms, which are now 
sometimes based on detailed mappings of problems of illicit SALW and armed violence, 
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may provide useful information for conducting this type of assessment. These plans are 
often developed with civil society involvement (as in Tanzania and Uganda). They often 
include projects that contribute to SSR and governance, and bring together a number of 
government departments in their construction.   
 
5.1.2 Building the capacity of customs services and border controls 
Cross-border arms smuggling and the movement of armed groups are key components of 
SALW availability and misuse.  If a country is suffering significant problems of arms 
trafficking – contributing to armed violence in rural areas or violent crime in urban 
centres – one security priority of the state should be to enhance the capacity of customs 
and border guards.  This requires adequate training in the interdiction of weapons 
smuggling, as well as equipment and resources for communication and transport. Early 
phasing of this support may contribute to a more secure foundation for broader 
governance and SSR programming, as well as helping to strengthen regional security and 
cooperation.  
 
5.1.3 Promoting effective stockpile management and security 
Within SSR, the management and security of arms and ammunition stockpiles is often 
seen as a technical issue or conducted later in SSR programs.  However, the leakage of 
arms and ammunition from state arsenals – either through theft or illegal sales by official 
personnel – is often a major source of arms in illicit circulation. Including arms stockpile 
security in SSR can provide an important practical focus for cooperation within a wider 
SSR programme, and have a major pay-off in terms of reducing risks of armed violence. 
Key programming opportunities for tackling stockpile problems include:  
 Early phasing of stockpile management in SSR programmes.  
 Advice and resources for ensuring good practice and secure storage. 
 Assistance in developing procedures for inventory management and accounting 
systems, e.g. in marking unmarked weapons, or establishing and maintaining 
weapons registries or centralised record keeping. 
 Training for personnel in stockpile management, security, and record keeping. 
 Advice and assistance in the secure destruction of surplus arms or their  
re-assignment. 
 Regulation and restriction of possession and storage of arms by off-duty police, 
military, judiciary and others. This is often important as off-duty personnel sometimes 
rent-out their weapons to criminals.   
 
5.1.4 Enhancing controls over civilian arms 
Almost 60% of firearms in global circulation are estimated to be in civilian hands. It is 
therefore important to establish controls over civilian arms through measures such as 
registration, and to engage in weapons collection programmes.  SSR programmes, by 
concentrating solely on the formal security sector, often ignore these issues.  
 
Key programming opportunities include:  
 Review and reform of relevant arms-related laws. 
 Support awareness raising and debate involving citizens, parliament, government and 
the police. 
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 Civilian arms registration and licensing.  
 Control over domestic arms markets – both legal and informal markets.  
 Regulation of craft production. 
 Guidelines for legitimate use of firearms (through community consultation). 
 Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes (VWCPs) and gun amnesties. Conducted 
in partnership with communities, these can help reduce arms availability as well as 
raising community awareness, which can contribute to the development of pro-poor 
security governance. Gun amnesties are useful opportunities for wider weapons 
collection and community security projects.   
  
5.2 SSAJ programming 
 
SSAJ is a key foundation for reducing SALW availability and armed violence. Key 
practical opportunities exist in SSAJ programming to deal with SALW and armed 
violence. These include policing, crime prevention, access to justice and community 
policing. 
 
5.2.1 Policing, crime prevention and access to justice 
Establishing effective controls over SALW, which are, after all, the tools of violent 
criminal activity, help to reduce levels of violence thereby enhancing the capacity of the 
police to engage in broader crime prevention and SSAJ activities. Practically this means: 
 Involving the communities in which policing and SSAJ provision is taking place.  
 Establishing controls over police weapons stocks and stored confiscated weapons 
(police arms are often widely dispersed in vulnerable locations, and sometimes vast 
numbers of confiscated weapons are stored insecurely pending use in evidence at 
trials etc).   
 Developing a trained and equipped police force combined with good civilian 
oversight. This will encourage communities to work with the state to tackle crime and 
arms trafficking. 
 SSR and SSAJ programmes can help to build a foundation of trust in the state to 
provide security. This is important to the success of VWCPs because in the absence 
of trust people are unlikely to hand over the weapons they perceive as their only 
option for protection.  
 In countries where direct engagement with the police or security sector is politically 
sensitive, SALW projects allow armed violence issues to be addressed through 
community support and awareness, for example, through Gun-Free Zones.  
 
5.2.2 Community policing 
Some of the key principles of community policing – consultation, community ownership 
and so forth – offer a significant entry point to tackling armed violence in that they help 
to make police and security governance more accountable to local populations. This, in 
turn, will help enhance the capacity of the police to tackle armed violence. For instance, 
police reform in Mozambique had little impact on violent crime levels until a community 
policing model was adopted.  Entry points for developing community policing 
relationships include: 
 Controlling civilian armaments. 
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 Tackling problems of criminal access to weapons. 
 Making police use of firearms accountable. 
 
Box 3: Weapons collection as an entry  
point in Mendoza, Argentina 
 
An arms exchange programme in the Argentine province of Mendoza provided an entry 
point to the development of broader community engagement and commitment to security 
measures.  The programme prompted debate, raised public awareness and was facilitated 
by a provincial law on disarmament, which is being expanded into other provinces.  The 
success of this programme contributed to: 
 The establishment of a bi-provincial security commission to develop provincial 
border controls.  
 The development of a permanent information exchange mechanism among police and 
provincial government institutions. 
 The harmonisation of police and judicial reform. 
 
It also attracted the support of the UNDP and other international agencies for a 
programme to improve the management and security of provincial government 
stockpiles, and public weapons destruction. 
 
 
6. Why are non-state security actors and traditional justice 
systems important for governance, SSR and SSAJ?   
 
Traditional justice systems and non-state security actors, such as militias and private 
security companies, are often mentioned in guidance notes on SSR and SSAJ but are 
seldom effectively addressed. Integration of SALW and armed violence issues into the 
planning of SSR and SSAJ programmes is likely to highlight the significance of these 
systems and actors in a number of ways.   
 
6.1 Traditional justice systems 
 
Traditional justice systems are often widely used in poor or conflict-prone societies. 
While these may be beneficial for channelling disputes and preventing violence, there 
should be legal limitations on their activities, coupled with a programme of registering 
and managing their weapons. As identified in existing DFID material on SSAJ: 
“Successful initiatives with non-state policing usually depend on state police 
involvement, and/or the development of internal controls to safeguard against 
discrimination or vigilantism.” Specific challenges related in this field include:  
 Whether the national police and the judiciary are willing and able (including 
appropriate training and operating procedures) to take on responsibilities in the 
traditional sector.  
 The complex challenges of appropriately separating traditional political, economic 
and administrative roles from those of security provision and dispute resolution. 
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 The potential negative impacts of incorporation.  In some cases the act of 
incorporation has the potential to diminish or destroy many of the advantages for 
ordinary citizens of using traditional structures.   
 
6.2 Militias and private security companies 
 
State incapacity to ensure the safety and security of people and property has led to the 
proliferation of non-state security actors: militias, vigilante groups, and private security 
companies (PSCs).  For instance, in some cases, PSCs in transition and post-conflict 
states employ more (and often better armed) personnel than the police.  While these may 
enhance the security of certain groups, they often disadvantage other groups, escalate 
conflicts, and further undermine governance. These actors also raise significant 
programming dilemmas: 
 
 Non-state security actors are often uncontrolled and unaccountable.  While in many 
cases it may be possible to bring them under the umbrella of security sector 
regulation, this is not always done. Establishing effective regulation of PSCs – by the 
state and the community – is essential to the safety and security of the population. 
 
 In some cases where the state’s capacity to provide security is limited, governments 
have sometimes distributed arms to local militia and civil defence forces. However, 
there is usually poor regulation of these actors and no control over the weapons.  
 
7. Recommendations  
 
Integrating SALW issues can contribute to the success of SSR and SSAJ programmes, 
which in turn can have an impact on levels of armed violence. Some key 
recommendations are: 
 Conduct a (pro-poor) security assessment to identify priorities for integration of 
SALW and armed violence issues within governance, SSR, and SSAJ programmes. 
Ensure that the results of this assessment inform and integrate governance, SSR and 
SSAJ programming. 
 Support SALW projects as an entry point to broader governance, SSR and SSAJ 
issues – with particular emphasis on building the awareness and capacity of civil 
society. Crime prevention and community policing initiatives are particularly useful 
here. 
 Ensure that technical aspects of SSR – such as stockpile management – take into 
account all the different routes of SALW availability.    
 Support controls over civilian arms to prevent their misuse and possible diversion to 
criminals.  
 Support VWCPs, Gun Free Zones and other SALW projects, ensuring that they are 
rooted in an understanding of community security priorities.  
 Engage with the problems thrown up by militias and traditional justice systems by 
ensuring adequate controls are developed over private security companies and 
militias.   
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It is important that DFID and other development agencies take steps to ensure that SALW 
programmes are appropriately linked, or integrated with, wider development 
programmes. If you wish to consult further about the possible relevance of SALW-related 
programmes to development strategies with which you are concerned, contact the SALW 
team at CHAD: 
Richard Haviland, SALW Programme Manager 
R-Haviland@dfid.gov.uk
Tel: +0044 (0)20 7023 0868 
 
Kate Joseph, Senior Non-Proliferation Consultant  
K-Joseph@dfid.gov.uk
Tel: +44 (0)20 7023 0359  
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